As happens every so often, I find myself in a set-theoretical morass. Please help me out of it.
Let $\Omega$ be a set and $\mathcal{B}$ a Boolean algebra of subsets of $\Omega$. The question, broadly, is how to reconcile the following three observations.
(1) From this post, it seems that the existence of a merely finitely additive probability (i.e., a probability that is finitely but not countably additive) on $(\Omega, \mathcal{B})$ cannot be shown in ZF. The proof of this claim proceeds as follows. It is known that the existence of a merely finitely additive probability $\mu$ on $(\mathbb{N}, 2^\mathbb{N})$, such that $\mu(n)=0$ for all $n$, cannot be shown in ZF. If there exists a merely finitely additive probability $P$ on $(\Omega, \mathcal{B})$, then a simple construction shows that $P$ can be used to define a merely finitely additive probability $\mu$ on $(\mathbb{N}, 2^\mathbb{N})$ such that $\mu(n)=0$ (see the linked post for details). Since the existence of $\mu$ cannot be shown in ZF, neither can the existence of $P$.
(2) Now, a friend of mine denies this conclusion. He thinks that merely finitely additive probabilities on $(\Omega, \mathcal{B})$ can be shown to exist using only the ZF axioms. His argument is essentially the same as the one that appears in this post. He assumes that $\mathcal{B}$ is well-ordered and extends the filter of cofinite subsets of $\Omega$ to a non-principal ultrafilter using transfinite induction on the well-order of $\mathcal{B}$. This yields a non-principal ultrafilter which, restricted to $\mathcal{B}$, defines a merely finitely additive probability (details can be provided if need be). So long as defining the well order on $\mathcal{B}$ doesn't require any choice (for example, let $\mathcal{B}$ be countable), the argument does seem to demonstrate that choice is not needed to show the existence of a merely finitely additive $P$.
(3) But now, to complicate things further, there is Theorem 2 of this paper by Pincus and Solovay, which states:
It is consistent with ZF, DC, and the Hahn-Banach theorem that every ultrafilter on any set is principal.
This seems to contradict my friend's claim in (2), adding further evidence to the claim made in (1), that the existence of a merely finitely additive $P$ on $(\Omega, \mathcal{B})$ cannot be shown in ZF.
To sum up, I am left wondering
Does there exist a set $\Omega$ and Boolean algebra $\mathcal{B}$ of subsets of $\Omega$ such that the existence of a merely finitely additive probability $P$ on $(\Omega, \mathcal{B})$ can be shown using only the ZF axioms?
and
Is there a set $\Omega$ such that the existence of a non-principal ultrafilter of subsets of $\Omega$ can be shown using only the ZF axioms?
Added. Here is the proof of (2), which seems to contradict the result cited in (3). Perhaps someone can indicate where it goes wrong.
We assume that $\mathcal{B}$ can be well-ordered without using the axiom of choice. For example, assume that $\mathcal{B}$ is countable. Let $\mathcal{F}_0$ be the filter of cofinite subsets of $\Omega$. We extend $F_0$ to a non-principal, proper ultrafilter of subsets of $\Omega$ by transfinite induction on the well order of $\mathcal{B}$.
Any proper filter $\mathcal{F}$ that extends $\mathcal{F}_0$ is clearly non-principal. Let $B \in \mathcal{B}$. The members of the filter generated by $\mathcal{F}$ and $B$ are supersets of sets that are intersections of members of $\mathcal{F}$ and $B$. If $B \cap F_1 = \emptyset$ where $F_1 \in \mathcal{F}$ and $(\Omega - B) \cap F_2 = \emptyset$ where $F_2 \in \mathcal{F}$, then $F_1 \cap F_2 = \emptyset$, contradicting the assumption that $\mathcal{F}$ is a proper filter. This shows that at each stage in the induction, we can add a member $B \in \mathcal{B}$ or its complement. At limit ordinals, we consider the filter that is the union of the chain of filters and continue until we end up with a non-principal, proper ultrafilter.