I know that it is possible to construct the hyperreal number system in ZFC by using the axiom of choice to obtain a non-principal ultrafilter. Would the non-existence of a set of hyperreals be consistent with just ZF, without choice? Let me be conservative, and say that by a "set of hyperreals," I just mean a set together with some relations and functions such that the transfer principle holds, and there exists $\epsilon > 0$ smaller than any real positive real number.
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5Abraham Robinson suggested that ZF and ZFC were in some sense constructed exactly so as to allow us to do analysis on the reals. From that point of view, it's not surprising that in ZF(C) the reals exist and are unique, whereas ZF doesn't make the hyperreals exist, and ZFC doesn't make the hyperreals unique. – Dec 04 '14 at 02:45
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@BenCrowell, I saw a remark of this sort in a paper by Keisler but I don't recall seeing it in Robinson. Do you have a source for this? – Mikhail Katz Dec 05 '14 at 09:33
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2@katz: Just because you added a comment about the philosophical implications of not assuming the axiom of choice, and just because you added that as an answer instead of a comment, doesn't mean that the question itself is about mathematical philosophy. This is not a question for "What are the philosophical arguments in favor of assuming a hyperreal field exists" or something similar. This is just a simple question, can we prove in $\sf ZF$ that a hyperreal field exists with the transfer principle? The answer to which has nothing to do with philosophy, or mathematical philosophy in particular. – Asaf Karagila Dec 05 '14 at 09:42
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What are you trying to ask? On possibile definition of a hyperreal number system is a system satisfying all the requirements for a complete ordered field but the requirement of completeness and replaces that requirement with the two requirements that for any Dedekind cut where you can take a number in each part to be arbitrarily close, the cut has a boundary number position, and there exists a number that exceeds all natural numbers. Another possible definition is the same definition with the additional requirement that it includes the real numbers and its operations on the real numbers are – Timothy Jan 15 '19 at 07:24
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the same as the ones defined for the real numbers. Are you asking whether it's consistent with ZF that it's the case that no system satisfies the additional requirement because for every system that satisfies the other requirements for a hyperreal number system, there does not exist a way to pick one member from each equivalence class of infinitesimally close hyperreal numbers such that it's closed under addition and subtraction because the axiom of choice is false? – Timothy Jan 15 '19 at 07:28
2 Answers
The answer is yes, provided ZF itself is consistent. The reason is that the existence of the hyperreals, in a context with the transfer principle, implies that there is a nonprincipal ultrafilter on $\mathbb{N}$.
Specifically, if $N$ is any nonstandard (infinite) natural number, then let $U$ be the set of all $X\subset\mathbb{N}$ with $N\in X^*$. This is a nonprincipal ultrafilter on $\mathbb{N}$, since:
- If $X\in U$ and $X\subset Y$, then $N\in X^*\subset Y^*$, and so $Y\in U$.
- If $X,Y\in U$, then $N\in X^*\cap Y^*=(X\cap Y)^*$ and so $X\cap Y\in U$.
- If $X\subset\mathbb{N}$, then every number is in $X$ or in $\mathbb{N}-X$, and so either $N\in X^*$ or $N\in(\mathbb{N}-X)^*$ and thus $X\in U$ or $\mathbb{N}-X\in U$.
- For any particular standard natural number $n$, the set $X=\{m\in \mathbb{N}\mid n\leq m\}$ is in $U$, because $n^*\leq N$.
- The empty set $\emptyset$ is not in $U$, since $N\notin\emptyset=\emptyset^*$.
So $U$ is a nonprincipal ultrafilter on $\mathbb{N}$. The way that I think about $U$ is that it concentrates on sets that express all and only the properties held by the nonstandard number $N$. (See also my answer to A remark of Connes, where I make a similar point, and explain that, therefore, nonstandard analysis with the transfer property implies that there must be a non-measurable set of reals.)
Thus, in a model of ZF with no nonprincipal ultrafilter on $\mathbb{N}$ (and as Asaf mentions in the comments, there are indeed such models if there are any models of ZF at all), there is no structure of the hyperreals satisfying the transfer principle.
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2It might be worth pointing that it is consistent with $\sf ZF$ that there are no free ultrafilters on $\Bbb N$. And for that matter, on any set. – Asaf Karagila Dec 04 '14 at 10:42
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3A small remark: in ZF the existence of a proper elementary extension of the structure $(\Bbb{N}, X)_{X\in\cal{P}(\omega)}$ is equivalent to the existence of a nonprincipal ultrafilter on $\Bbb{N}$. Joel has explained one direction, the other direction uses a standard ultrapower argument (the Łoś-theorem goes through in the absence of choice in this case since $\Bbb{N}$ is well-orderable). – Ali Enayat Dec 08 '14 at 23:46
In response specifically to the title of the question: "Is non-existence of the hyperreals consistent with ZF?", technically speaking the answer is NO. Kanovei and Shelah constructed a definable model of the hyperreals in ZF; see http://arxiv.org/pdf/math/0311165.pdf
Therefore ZF is not "consistent with the nonexistence of the hyperreals". Of course, to prove any of their properties (such that that they are actually a proper extension, satisfy transfer, etc) one needs AC, but the same goes for many other crucial mathematical results (see below).
Goldblatt in his book "Lectures on the hyperreals" takes countable additivity to be part of the definition of measure (see M1 on page 206). Then he uses hyperfinite partitions, outer measures, and transfer to show that express the Lebesgue measure in terms of the Loeb measure (page 217). In particular countable additivity of Lebesgue measure follows.
Note that the failure of countable additivity of the Lebesgue measure (such countable additivity is taken for granted in analysis) is also consistent with ZF; see Is sigma-additivity of Lebesgue measure deducible from ZF?
Similarly, it is consistent with ZF that the Hanh-Banach theorem (arguably foundation of functional analysis) fails.
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5Seems like a reasonable comment. Not quite an answer to the question at hand. – Asaf Karagila Dec 04 '14 at 18:17
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1@Asaf, the philosophical implications are clearly in the background of this question. – Mikhail Katz Dec 05 '14 at 09:34
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4Yes, and this is a very good comment. Answers should answer the question, not make remarks on its background. – Asaf Karagila Dec 05 '14 at 09:39
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7@AsafKaragila I find your criteria to be unnecessarily restrictive. We should welcome any post that makes, as here, a substantive and interesting mathematical contribution bearing on a question. I believe that expert and insightful remarks on the background of a question, in general, make fine answers. – Joel David Hamkins Dec 05 '14 at 12:14
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2@Joel: This is a discussion for the meta site, rather than here. But I think that answers should be answers. Of course, a question asking for something, and you want to post an answer showing that certain assumptions are really needed, is some sort of answer. But if you are giving it as an answer, you should at least give some substantial explanation. Here, on the other hand, there is just a remark equivalent to "Hey, by the way, the axiom of choice is needed elsewhere in analysis", and not much longer either. I agree *this* makes an excellent comment, it makes a bad answer, though. – Asaf Karagila Dec 05 '14 at 12:41
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3Asaf, my personal view is that we should welcome any mathematically substantive, interesting post that sheds light on the issues of a question. So I don't really agree to have the kind of formal rules that you are advocating. (And my comments here object to your criterion only in so far as you have put it forth as a general rule, apart from the merits of this particular case.) – Joel David Hamkins Dec 06 '14 at 22:34
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1The argument in Goldblatt does not prove countable additivity of Lebesgue measure from the existence of the hyperreals in ZF. Rather, Goldblatt constructs (without proof) both Loeb and Lebesgue measure using the usual outer measure machinery which uses countable choice, and then proves they are equal. In addition, Goldblatt throughout assumes not just existence of a hyperreal field with transfer but also countable saturation. – Eric Wofsey Dec 07 '14 at 07:07
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@EricWofsey, thanks for your comment. I looked over the proof the other day and did not find any mention of countable choice, but perhaps the proof relies on this implicitly. Goldblatt does provide some proofs so you can't make a blanket statement that he constructs them "without proof". It seems to me that the construction of outer measure should be doable without using choice, but I haven't thought about this seriously in a while. Could you substantiate your claims by more specific references to Goldblatt? Reliance on saturation is certainly a difficulty here if one wants to derive... – Mikhail Katz Dec 07 '14 at 08:25
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...countable additivity purely from transfer. Apart from Goldblatt's approach, do you think it is feasible to derive countable additivity of Lebesgue measure using hyperfinite subdivisions and transfer? This seems like an interesting question in reverse mathematics where you may be more of an expert than myself (sorry didn't get a chance to look you up on mathscinet yet ;-) – Mikhail Katz Dec 07 '14 at 08:26
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I'm not any expert on this and I haven't looked through the arguments closely enough to be able to answer your last question, though I will remark that existence of a nonprincipal ultrafilter is indepedent of countable choice and thus it seems unlikely that it implies $\sigma$-additivity of Lebesgue measure. But the key step that Goldblatt leaves out (and which uses countable choice) is section 16.3, where he states without proof the Caratheodory extension theorem. If you read the first paragraph of 16.5, it is clear that this is crucial to his construction of Loeb measure. – Eric Wofsey Dec 07 '14 at 09:04
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I should perhaps mention that the Caratheodory extension theorem, in the form Goldblatt states it at the end of 16.3, definitely requires countable choice, as it easily implies that $\mathbb{R}$ is not a countable union of countable sets (let $\mathcal{A}$ be finite unions of half-open intervals and $\mu$ be Lebesgue measure on $\mathcal{A}$). – Eric Wofsey Dec 07 '14 at 09:08
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@EricWofsey, thanks. Note however that a nonprincipal ultrafilter is not enough to prove transfer, so in principle it is possible that in transfer should imply countable additivity, though your comment about Caratheodory does seem to make this difficult. – Mikhail Katz Dec 07 '14 at 09:23
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1Transfer plus countable choice proves $\omega_1$-saturation, since transfer gives you the ultrafilter and countable choice gives you the Los theorem, so you can build the ultrapower, which has saturation. – Joel David Hamkins Dec 08 '14 at 13:16
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